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NOTES
In re S.R.H. A Decline in the Juvenile's
Right to Notice in Illinois
INTRODUCTION

A fundamental precept of American jurisprudence is that a
prosecution for a crime is not legally effective unless preceded by
a formal accusation.1 Both the United States and Illinois constitutions insure the right of the accused to demand a formal accusation of the charges against him. 2 These constitutional guarantees are embodied in statutes governing criminal procedure 3 and
the promulgation of criminal charges.4

1. 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 225 (C. Torcia 12th ed. 1975).
2. This right is guaranteed by two sections of the United States Constitution. The
sixth amendment requires that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
right to be apprised of the nature and cause of the charges against him. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. This right has been applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). In addition, an individual is protected in criminal trials by the fourteenth amendment's general
proscription that no person can be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Illinois Constitution contains a similar due
process clause. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2. It also provides that in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused has the right to "demand the nature and cause of the accusation and have a
copy thereof." Id. § 8.
3. The Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure ("the Code") is contained in ILL REV. STAT.
ch. 38 (1983). The purposes of the Code are to:
(a) Secure simplicity in procedure;
(b) Ensure fairness in administration including the elimination of unjustifiable
delay;
(c) Ensure the effective apprehension and trial of persons accused of a crime;
(d) Provide for a just determination of every criminal proceeding by a fair and
impartial trial and adequate review; and
(e) Preserve the public welfare and secure the fundamental rights of individuals.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 101-1 (1983). The foundation for these purposes lies in the guar-

antees given to all individuals in the Illinois Constitution. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,

101-1 committee comments (Smith-Hurd 1981).
4. The provisions governing the promulgation of criminal charges are contained in
111-1 to 111-7
Title III of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch 28,
(1983).
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In Illinois, these procedural protections are automatically available to adult criminal defendants.5 Due to the separation between
juvenile and criminal courts,6 however, a juvenile's standing to
assert these statutory protections is not as clearly defined. The
juvenile courts were originally conceived as a rehabilitative alternative to the punitive environment of criminal courts. As such,
they developed largely outside of the doctrines of modem crimi7
nal procedure.
Recent developments in juvenile law have provided juveniles
with some of the constitutional rights afforded adults, including
the right to notice of the charge.8 The minor's right to proper
notice of the violation charged engenders the impartiality and
accuracy of the fact-finding process in these quasi-criminal proceedings. 9
The Illinois Supreme Court recently defined the scope of the
juvenile's right to notice in In re S.R.H.10 In S.R.H., the court
outlined the proper test to determine the sufficiency of a juvenile
delinquency petition challenged for the first time at trial. The
court declined to apply the standard currently employed to test
the sufficiency of a criminal indictment challenged at the trial
level." Instead, the majority held that a petition would be subject to the less stringent actual prejudice test, which is used to
judge the adequacy of an indictment challenged for the first time
12
on appeal.
This note will review the function of charging instruments in
criminal proceedings and the development of the juvenile court
system, with an emphasis upon the evolving standards of notice
in the juvenile setting. It will then address the procedural rights
of minors recognized by the United States Supreme Court, as
well as the protection afforded minors under the Illinois Juvenile
Court Act. A discussion of the S.R.H. decision will follow. Finally,
this note will analyze the opinion's statutory and constitutional
implications, as well as the practical effect the court's holding
will have on the operations of the Illinois juvenile courts.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, 100-2 (1983).
See infra text accompanying notes 33-48.
See infra text accompanying notes 33-59.
See infra text accompanying notes 70-87.
See infra text accompanying notes 79-83.

10. 96 11. 2d 138,449 N.E.2d 129 (1983).
11. Id. at 142, 449 N.E.2d at 131.
12. Id. at 143, 449 N.E.2d at 132.
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BACKGROUND

Notice in the Criminal Context: Purposeand Procedure
In adult criminal proceedings, the charge usually takes the
form of an indictment or information.'3 At common law, criminal charges were held to strict pleading requirements, and were
scrutinized carefully by the courts. 14 A criminal accusation would
be dismissed if it failed to contain the requisite degree of specificity or if it contained superfluous details not later proven at trial. 15 The advent of criminal discovery rules and the availability
of pre-trial hearings and bills of particulars 16 have obviated the
need for the formalistic requirements of early criminal proceedings.' 7 Despite the relaxation of stringent common law pleadings, however, the modem criminal charge must still comply

13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 38, 111-1 (1983). There are three different types of criminal
accusations, classified according to the source of the accusation: the indictment, which is
a written document originating with the grand jury; an information, which is a written
charge filed by the prosecutor without the consultation of a grand jury; and the complaint, which is a written document under oath filed by a private citizen. Scott, Fairness
in Accusation of A Crime, 41 MINN. L. REV. 509, 512 (1957). In Illinois, all felonies must
be charged by indictment or information. See People v. Pankey, 94 Ill. 2d 12, 445 N.E.2d
284 (1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 111-2(a) (1983).
14. The pleadings were read strictly in an attempt to protect the accused. At common
law, a defendant was forced to prepare his defense on the basis of the pleadings alone.
The criminal pleadings were thus designed to provide the defendant with the clearest
description of the charge as reasonably possible. Goldstein, The State and the Accused:
Balance of Advantage in CriminalProcedure,69 YALE LJ. 1149, 1174 (1960).
15.

R. MCNAMARA, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 110 (1982).

See Scott, supranote 13, at 512.
16. The Illinois Criminal Code provides:
When an indictment, information or complaint charges an offense in accordance with the provision of $ 111-3 of this code but fails to specify the particulars
of the offense sufficiently to enable the defendant to prepare his defense the
court may, on written motion of the defendant, require the States Attorney to
furnish the defendant with a Bill of Particulars containing such particulars as
may be necessary for the preparation of the defense.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch 38, 111-6 (1983). This is consistent with the modern trend in criminal
accusations, which allows greater brevity in the charge than was required at common
law, but provides the defendant with a bill of particulars if he needs additional information to prepare his defense. Bills of particulars also benefit the defendant in that they
insure him against surprise by limiting the scope of the prosecution's case to the particulars specified in the bill. 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 355 (C. Torcia 12th ed.
1975).
17. Goldstein, supra note 14, at 1174. Goldstein criticizes these changes as relaxing
the duties of the prosecutor without concomitantly affording the defendant realistic
access to further information relating to his charge. See also Scott, supra note 13, at
530-31.
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with both statutory and constitutional standards in order to con18
stitute a valid accusation.
The modern indictment or information serves three essential
functions. 19 First, the indictment provides notice to the accused
of the specific elements of the crime charged so that he can prepare his defense. 20 Second, the criminal charge must specifically
describe the offense to insure that the accused can plead a sub21
sequent acquittal or conviction as a bar to future prosecution.
This requirement enables the accused to raise the defense of
double jeopardy if tried again for the same offense. 22 Third, the
criminal charge informs the court of the specific allegations
against the accused, thereby enlightening the court as to the
23
nature of the case and the issues to be presented at trial.
The Illinois Criminal Code dictates the specificity required in a
criminal charge and the options available to a defendant if the
charge fails to comply with the statutory requirements. 24 Under
Illinois law, a criminal accusation must be written, contain a
citation to the statutory provision allegedly violated, and set

18. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1947) (reversed conviction of individuals charged
by information and tried for violation of section 2 of a statute, and convicted of violating
section 1); Hagner v. United States, 284 U.S. 614 (1932) (defendant's conviction for
inproper use of the mails upheld because it contained all the essential elements of the
offense intended to be charged).
19. One of the clearest statements of the important purposes underlying an individual's constitutional right to notice is found in Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962),
in which the defendants were indicted for refusing to answer certain questions when
summoned before a congressional subcommittee. All of the indictments failed to state the
subject matter of the congressional inquiry. The Court held the indictments inadequate
because the omissions failed to properly identify the wrongful conduct for the defendant
and the court. Id. at 758-69. Although Russell is a federal case, the principles enunciated
therein have been reiterated by the Illinois courts. See, e.g., People v. Grieco, 44 111. 2d 407,
255 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
20. Russell, 369 U.S. at 763; R. McNAMARA, supra note 15, at 111.
21. Russell, 369 U.S. at 764.
22. An individual is protected against double jeopardy by the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This right has been applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794
(1969).
23. Russell, 369 U.S. at 768. This function was noted by the Supreme Court nearly 100
years ago in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 548 (1875).
24. For the requirements of the charge itself, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch 38,
111-1 to
111-7 (1983). If the charge fails to satisfy the statutory requirements, the defendant may
move the trial court to dismiss the suit. The Code dictates that the court may dismiss the
charge if it fails to state an offense and the court shall grant the defendant's motions in
arrest of judgment when the indictment, information, or complaint fails to charge an
offense. Id.
114-1(8), 116-2(b) (1).
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forth the nature and elements of the offense. 25 These procedural
rules serve to protect the due process rights of an individual
26
accused of a crime.
An indictment challenged by the defendant at the trial level
will be dismissed if it fails to state the nature and the elements of
the offense in accordance with the Illinois Code.27 Prejudice to
the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to notice is
presumed when notice is either missing or inadequate. 28 When a
defect is challenged for the first time on appeal, however, the
factors which induce a trial court to dismiss or amend the charging instrument are not as controlling.29 At this point, the defendant has undergone an entire trial on the merits and presented
his defense without objecting to the adequacy of the charge. The
appellate court assumes that the defendant was adequately
informed of the charge against him and, accordingly, adopts a
lesser standard of scrutiny to determine the sufficiency of the
indictment.30 The appellate court will not dismiss the charge
unless the defendant can establish actual prejudice resulting
from any deficiencies in the pleading.31
Development of the Illinois Juvenile Court System
and the Juvenile's Right to Notice
Prior to 1899, the rules of criminal procedure regarding the
formal accusation were applicable to both adults and juveniles

25. Id. $ 111-3(a).
26. ILL ANN. STAT.ch. 38, 99 111-3, 114-1 committee comments (Smith-Hurd 1981).
27. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 99 111-3(3) (a), 114-1(8), 116-2(b)(1) (1983).
28. People v. Abrams, 48 Ill. 2d 446, 271 N.E.2d 37 (1971) (complaints charging battery
dismissed for failure to allege that physical contact was insulting or provoking); People v.
Lutz, 73 Ill. 2d 204, 383 N.E.2d 171 (1978) (indictment for battery dismissed for failure to
allege "bodily harm"). See also In re S.R.H., 96 Ill. 2d 129, 133, 449 N.E.2d 138, 146 (1983)
(Simon, J., dissenting); Scott, supra note 13, at 519. See infra text accompanying notes
172-74.
29. See People v. Gilmore, 63 Ill. 2d 23, 344 N.E.2d 456 (1976) (omission of payee's
name in indictment will not reverse a forgery conviction when error is first challenged on
appeal); People v. Pujoue, 61111. 2d 335, 335 N.E.2d 437 (1975) (sufficiency of a complaint
attacked for the first time on appeal must be determined by a different standard; therefore, complaint failing to allege a gun was loaded was not fatally defective).
30. J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED: PRETRIAL RIGHTS 481 (1972).
31. The "actual prejudice" test will be satisfied if the defendant can establish that he
was prejudiced in the preparation of his defense or that the omission subjects him to a
threat of double jeopardy. People v. Pujoue, 61 Ill. 2d 335, 339, 335 N.E.2d 437, 440 (1975);
People v. Walker, 83 Ill. 2d 306, 314, 415 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (1980). See also Scott, supra
note 13, at 519.
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who had been accused of a crime. 32 At common law, a child was
considered responsible for his criminal acts at the age of seven.
Between the ages of seven and fourteen the child was presumed
incapable of committing a crime, but the presumption could be
rebutted. 3 A child accused of a crime was tried in adult court in
accordance with the same rules of procedure governing his adult
counterparts.3 4 If convicted, the child was branded as a criminal
and often imprisoned in the same facilities as hardened adult
35
criminals.
The concept of developing separate juvenile facilities arose in
reaction to the treatment juveniles had received in adult criminal
courts.3 6 In 1899, Illinois enacted legislation promulgating a
juvenile court system. 37 Reformers and sociologists throughout
the country heralded the state's initiative.38 The establishment
of a separate juvenile system fulfiled two fundamental objectives: to remove the possibility of incarcerating juveniles with
adults, and to remove the stigma associated with an adult crimi-

32. In 1899, the Illinois Legislature passed the first juvenile court act. Act of Apr. 21,
1899, ch. 23,
169-190 Ill. Laws 131 (1899). Eventually all 50 states adopted similar
provisions regarding juveniles. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An HistoricalPerspective,
22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1227 (1970). The pleading requirements in criminal courts were
still very strict at the time these statutes were enacted. See United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542, 558-59 (1875). The development of discovery procedures and the concomitant
relaxation of the criminal pleading requirements occurred subsequent to the division

between adult criminal courts and juvenile courts.
33. Clark, Why Gault:Juvenile Court Theory and Impact in HistoricalPerspective,in
GAULT: WHAT Now FOR THE JUVENILE COURT? 2 (V. Nordin ed. 1968).

34. Antieau, ConstitutionalRights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387, 390-92
(1961). See also People ex rel O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 8 Am. Rep. 645 (1870) (juvenile entitled to due process of law); Commonwealth v. Horregan, 127 Mass. 450 (1879)
(right to grand jury); State ex rel Cunningham v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406 (1885) (trial by jury).
35. Paulsen, Children's Court: Gateway or Last Resort?, in GAULT: WHAT NOW FOR THE
JUVENILE COURT? 42 (V. Nordin ed. 1968).
36. See generally T. HURLEY, OIGIN OF THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT LAW (1907). Hur-

ley was one of the major proponents of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act. He was also the
first Chief Probation Officer of the Cook County Juvenile Court System. See also Mack,
The Juvenile Court,23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107-09 (1909) (juvenile courts were established
to protect juveniles from stigma of being labeled a criminal).
37. The statute required local counties to designate a separate juvenile courtroom with
original jurisdiction over delinquency and dependancy cases involving children under 16
years of age. ILL. GEN. LAWS ch. 23, 169-90 (1901); T. HURLEY, supra note 36, at 143. See
also Fox, supra note 32, at 1121-22; Mack, supra note 36, at 111-13. Today the Juvenile
Court Act governs the Illinois juvenile courts. This Statute gives the courts jurisdiction
over children until they reach the age of 21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
701-11 to 708-4
(1983).
38. See generally T. HURLEY, supranote 36, at 9-11, 48-49; Fox, supra note 32, at 112122; Mack, supranote 36, at 107.
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nal conviction. 39

The purpose of the reform movement was to shift the focus of
juvenile proceedings away from punishment. 40 Under the theory
of parens patriae, 41 the state obtained jurisdiction over wayward
youths in an attempt to rehabilitate them before they became
engulfed in a life of crime. 42 Because the objective of the juvenile
delinquency proceeding was rehabilitation, the formalities of the
adult adversarial system were considered inappropriate in the
juvenile court setting. 43 Instead, an informal, individualized assessment of the juvenile's problem would enable the judge to tailor a

39. T. HURLEY, supra note 36, at 11; Note, JuvenileJustice:Procedural Safeguards for
Delinquents at the Adjudicatory Stage-Not For Adults Only, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 288,
291-92 (1982).
40. The reformers theorized that the punishment of juveniles at an early age benefitted neither the juvenile nor the interests of the state as a whole. By focusing upon the
juvenile's individual problems, they felt that the court could deter the juvenile in his
anti-social tendencies and thus benefit both the individual and the community. T. HuRLEY, supra note 36, at 56-62. See generally Mack, supra note 36.
41. "Parens patriae" refers to the traditional English theory under which courts of
equity could exercise jurisdiction over children whose parents had not provided for their
welfare. Its roots lie in the King's royal prerogative to act as guardian over children
improperly cared for by their parents. Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the American
Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 22-27 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
The original juvenile court acts gave the state broad powers of jurisdiction over juveniles alleged to be delinquent or dependant. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 15-17. Illinois' initial
act defined a delinquent child as:
[A]ny child under the age of sixteen who violates any law of this state or any
city or village ordinance, or who is incorrigible; or who knowingly associates
with thieves, vicious or immoral persons; or who is growing up in idleness or
crime; or who knowingly frequents a house of ill fame; or who knowingly
patronizes any policy shop or place where any gaming device is, or shall be
operated.
ILL. GEN. LAws. ch. 23, 169 (1899). See generally George, Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings: The Due ProcessModel, 40 U. CoLo. L. REV. 315 (1968).
42. In 1899, the Chicago Bar Association explained the philosophy of the Illinois
juvenile system:
[Tihe state must step in and exercise guardianship over a child found under
such adverse social or individual condition as develop crime .... [Ilt proposes a
plan whereby he may be treated, not as a criminal or one legally charged with a
crime, but as a ward of the state, to receive practically the care, custody and
discipline as "shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be
given by its parents."
T. HURLEY, supra note 36, at 47.
43. The developers of the juvenile code felt that the formal setting and ceremony of an
adult trial intimidated juveniles and did not serve as a constructive deterrent to the juvenile crime problem. T. HURLEY, supranote 36, at 23-24. See Paulsen, Fairnessto the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1957). For example, Paulsen maintained that recogni-
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disposition to fit the rehabilitative needs of the particular
44
juvenile.
The proponents of the 1899 Illinois Juvenile Court Act attempted to eliminate all aspects of criminal procedure from the juvenile system45 in order to prevent the child from being branded a
47
criminal. 46 Juvenile proceedings were considered civil in nature.
Their ultimate goal was to create an open setting in which the
juvenile could admit his transgressions to a benevolent judge,
who would then prescribe the proper treatment for the youth's
rehabilitation. 48

tion of certain procedures, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, would be

"unfortunate" in the juvenile proceeding. The hearing is part of the rehabilitative process, and could not be fully effective if the juvenile was told he did not have to speak to
the judge. According to Paulsen, because the proceedings were designed to be nonaccusatory, the privilege against self-incrimination would clearly be inappropriate in
juvenile court. Id. at 561. See also Mack, supra note 36, at 120. But see Antieau, supra
note 34, at 392; Handler, supranote 41, at 27. Both of these authors criticize the informality of the juvenile court system as a source of the juvenile's distrust and unwillingness to
cooperate with the system. They argue that if the juvenile perceives unfairness or arbitrariness in the proceedings, then the rehabilitative goals of the system cannot be
achieved.
44. The role of the juvenile court judge was parental. 'To the parent [he] is an elder
brother, offering encouragement and helpful advice as to how the home may be improved
and the environment of the children sweetened and purified." T. HURLEY, supra note 36,
at 62. See also Mack, supra note 36, at 119-20. Hurley explained:
It was intended by the framers of the Juvenile Court Law that the court, in
administering the law, should go much deper [sic] into the study of childlife
than a mere attempt at punishment for any small, specific depredation would
permit .... The work of the court is to inquire into the causes of the dependency
or delinquency, to find out why the child went wrong in the first place, to
remove the cause of the fall from grace, and to start the little one on the right
road.
T. HURLEY, supra note 36, at 60, 63. See Lipsett, Due ProcessAs A Gateway to Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Justice System, 49 B.U.L. REv. 62,63 (1969).
45. See supra note 43. One reformer commented:
In the preparation of the [Illinois] bill, great care was given to eliminate in
every way the idea of criminal procedure ....All of the procedings were to be
informal. The strict rules of evidence were not to be adhered to, the effort being,
first to find out what was the best thing to be done for the child, and second, if
possible to do it.
T. HURLEY, supra note 36, at 23-24. See also Lipsett, supra note 44, at 63.
46. Paulsen, supra note 43, at 554. Paulsen explained that a youth's rights are not
those of a person accused of a crime because he is to be protected from the stigma of
crime. The state does not accuse him, but proceeds in his interest.
47. The civil label attached to the proceedings evolved from the reformers' avoidance
of any vestiges of criminal procedure and from the theory of parens patriae itself. See
supra notes 41, 45.
48. See supra notes 43, 44. Although the juvenile courts were challenged on constitututional grounds, the Illinois high court dispelled any question regarding their constitu-
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In light of this procedural framework, the indictment was
replaced by a more informal charging document called a petition. 49 The juvenile courts assumed that because they were
interested in aiding the child, no one would oppose the form or
contents of the charges contained in the petition.5° As a consequence
of the leniency of the courts, the standards of notice routinely
followed in adult trials 51 were rarely enforced.5 2 Adult standards
were deemed inapplicable because they would only disrupt the
proceedings and interfere with the state's efforts to help the
53
child.

tionality as early as 1913. See Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N.E. 892 (1913). Courts
generally felt that constitutional safeguards of criminal trials were unnecessary in juvenile proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905). In People v.
Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1933), a minor who
was declared delinquent and sentenced to a state industrial school for stealing $12 contested the constitutionality of the statute and a confession taken from him without any
warnings against self-incrimination. The majority upheld the statute and the decree, stating: "Since the proceeding was not a criminal one, there was neither right to nor necessity for the procedural safeguards prescribed by constitution and statute in criminal
cases. Id. at 174, 183 N.E. at 355. See also Antieau, supra note 34, at 383; Paulsen, supra
note 43, at 549.
49. T. HURLEY. supra note 36, at 23-24; Antieau, supra note 34, at 387-90; Mack, supra
note 36, at 109-12. A petition in delinquency had to contain allegations of unlawful or
improper conduct which would be tried if not admitted by the juvenile. The test of sufficiency usually involved a determination of "whether the child is adequately informed of
his reasons for being in court." Paulsen, supra note 43, at 557. But see Handler, supra
note 41, at 26. Handler reasoned that certain facets of the adversary system, including
the specificity of adult charging instruments, should have been incorporated into the
juvenile court structure because they are better able to insure an accurate presentation of
the facts.
50. Antieau, supranote 34, at 409-10; Handler, supra note 41, at 22-23.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 13-31. For a description of the pleading
requirements in adult courts, see Scott, supra note 13, at 524-38. Allegations which would
have been designated as overly vague in criminal courts were often upheld in juvenile
courts. Instead of requiring a specific violation of the law, petitions had to describe a
standard of conduct which indicated the appropriateness of state intervention. Allegations that would be subject to a motion to quash in criminal court were routinely upheld
in juvenile proceedings. Paulsen, supra note 43, at 556-57.
52. Inexpertly drawn delinquency petitions were deemed sufficient if the court felt
that the juvenile was not prejudiced thereby. Paulsen, supra note 43, at 557. This philosophy is reflected in State in the Interest of Graham, 110 Utah 159, 170 P.2d 172 (1946),
wherein the court stated that, "[i]t is not necessary that the petition be drawn by one
learned in the law ....[Ilt should show in plain language the facts which reveal dependency, neglect or delinquency. An intelligent layman should be able to do that." Id. at
168, 170 P.2d at 177. The scope of the delinquency statutes also permitted authorities to
detain children on the basis of allegations which would be unconstitutionally vague in an
adult criminal court. Paulsen, supra note 43, at 556. See supra note 41.
53. The juvenile courts also adopted liberal amendment procedures in an attempt to
implement their goal of providing assistance to children in need. The courts reasoned
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While the courts generally recited some requirements of notice,5 4 the standards to satisfy them were neither uniform nor
stringent. 55 Juvenile courts routinely disregarded even civil rules
of procedure regarding appropriate notice. 56 Petitions of delinquency filed in juvenile court were often based upon hearsay and
gossip.5 7 Many consisted of general allegations of anti-social
conduct such as incorrigibility or truancy.5 8 The parens patriae

that unlike the sentence in criminal court, a juvenile court's disposition is tailored according to the needs of the child, not according to the delinquent act. "[W]hether the child
steals a tire or burglarizes a house should make little difference .
. [Hlis treatment
should depend on his needs." Paulsen, supra note 43, at 558. In addition, if the juvenile
objected to the charges, the availability of motions to quash or bills of particulars is not
clearly required. Paulsen, supra note 43, at 557.
54. See, e.g., Ex parte Mei, 122 N.J. Eq. 125, 192 A. 80 (1937) (person must be tried
with a specific act so that he may defend against it and so that it may be known if the
act charged is a crime); People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932), cert. denied,
289 U.S. 709 (1933) (procedural safeguards prescribed by Constitution in criminal cases
are inapplicable, but there must be a reasonably definate charge). See also IJA/ABA
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 25-26, 28-33 (1980) [hereinafter cited as JJS PRETRIAL]. But see Handler, supra note 41, at 22. Handler reported that
despite the requirements articulated in People v. Lewis, these standards were rarely followed. Petitions were not screened for irrelevant or prejudicial information, and they
often contained unreliable or unsupported allegations.
55. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel Yonick v. Briggs, 266 F. 434 (W.D. Pa. 1920) (due process right
to notice is satisfied by statement that juvenile is incorrigible); People v. Piccolo, 275 Ill.
453, 114 N.E. 145 (1916) (petition alleging child is delinquent and parents were unequal to
the task of controlling her upheld); In re Vera Brown, 117 111. App. 332 (1904) (petition
alleging delinquency because child is "dependant, has not proper parental care; that her
father's residence is unknown, and that her mother is not able to care properly for her"
upheld). See generallyJJS PRETRIAL, supra note 54, at 29.
56. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 n.22 (1967).
57. Antieau, supranote 34, at 411; Handler, supra note 41, at 22.
58. Handler, supranote 41, at 14; Note, supranote 39, at 291. The first petition filed in
Cook County, Ill., alleged, "I am unable to keep at home. Associates with bad boys. Steals
newspapers, etc." On the basis of these allegations, a jury was empanelled, and the youth
was declared a dependant and sent to the Illinois Manual Training School Farm. Statement of William S. White, 6 PEPPERDINE L REV. 597 (1979). (Justice White is the president
of the National Counsel of Juvenile Court Judges. The speech was given to the United
States Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency on Apr. 10, 1978.) See
also Paulsen, supra note 43, at 557. Paulsen defended this practice of generalized allegations, as follows:
If the treatment process is, in fact, rehabilitative, and redemptive, it ought to
be applied to cases in which the youngster's commission is just a matter of
time ....
[I]f
[parental] control is permitting criminality to develop or is seriously
defective in other ways, the rest of us must take a hand ....Unhappily, the
standard cannot state with precision the circumstances under which the courts
will act. Nevertheless, the only alternative would be to refrain from action
which might salvage an obviously deteriorating life.
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philopsophy and the perceived beneficent purpose of the proceedings usually served to override any complaints concerning improp59
er notice or denial of due process of law.
Reaction to the Reform Movement: Implementation of
ConstitutionalSafeguardsfor Juveniles
The juvenile courts were not without their critics.60 Beginning
in the 1950's, a growing skepticism regarding the objectives and
1
procedures of the juvenile courts crept into judicial opinions 6
and legal commentaries. 62 Perceived inequities in the juvenile
court system led many critics to demand constitutional stand63
ards in the proceedings.
59. See supra notes 41-48.
60. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 175, 183 N.E. 353, 356 (1932) (Crane, J.,
dissenting). Justice Crane argued that the legislature cannot eliminate constitutional protections in the name of charity merely by changing the name of an act which is in reality
the same offense. For an early criticism of the Juvenile Courts, see Wigmore, Juvenile
Court v. Criminal Court, 21 ILL L. REv. 375 (1926). Wigmore supported the establishment

of the juvenile courts, but felt that their procedures were unsuited to cases involving
children accused of serious crimes. See generally Antieau, supra note 34.
61. See, e.g., In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955) (juvenile accused of unlawful
use of automobile is entitled to counsel, and the juvenile proceeding must conform to the
requirements of due process); In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952)
(juvenile accused of assault cannot be judged delinquent on evidence and testimony
insufficient to establish probable cause or reasonable doubt; civil label is a fiction, and
juveniles are entitled to due process of law); In re Homes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523, cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (juvenile accused of stealing a car
should not be adjudged delinquent on the basis of hearsay; the informality of the courts
has led to confusion, sloppiness and unreliability).
62. See generally GAULT: WHAT Now FOR THE JUVENILE CouRTs? (V. Nordin ed. 1968);
JUSTICE FOR THE CHI-D THE JUVENILE COURT IN TRANSMON (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962); Antieau,
supra note 34; Handler, supranote 41.
63. Much of the criticism focused on the theory underlying the establishment of the
juvenile courts. The system developed by the reformers had been based upon a type of
exchange: the juvenile relinquished the constitutional safeguards inherent in an adult
trial in exchange for the socially rehabilitative benefits of the juvenile system. Recent
Decisions, 56 ILL B.J. 320, 321 (1967). The inequities of the system and the dubious validity of this exchange resulted in a situation where the juvenile "receiveld] the worst of
both worlds: he gto]t neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated for children." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556
(1965) (footnotes omitted). This criticism arose at a time when procedures utilized in adult
criminal trials were also under constitutional attack. Michael & Cunningham, From
Gault to Urbasek: For the Young the Best of Both Worlds, 49 CHI. B. REC. 162 (1968).
Beginning in the 1950's, the Warren Court's expansion of the protections in the Bill of
Rights lent greater support to the argument that fundamental concepts of fairness
required uniform procedures patterned after the explicit protections in the Bill of Rights
for both adult and juvenile proceedings. For an analysis of this development in adult
criminal trials, see Pye, The Warren Court and CriminalProcedure, 67 MICH. L. REv. 249
(1968).
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The United States Supreme Court addressed the applicability
of the United States Constitution to juvenile proceedings for the
first time in 1966.64 In Kent v. United States,65 the Court discussed the statutory procedures pursuant to which a juvenile
court could properly waive jurisdiction over a juvenile and transfer the case to criminal court.6 6 The Court held that neither the
theory of parens patriae nor the civil label attached to juvenile
proceedings could obviate the juvenile's right to a pre-transfer
hearing as contemplated by the statute in question. 67 Kent purported to be solely a statutory interpretation of a waiver statute.
Throughout the opinion, however, the Court implied that its
decision was mandated by both the statute and the United
68
States Constitution.
The due process undertones of the Kent decision were clarified
the following year in the landmark case of In re Gault.69 Addressing itself solely to the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile
delinquency proceeding,70 the Court rejected the state's argu-

64. The Supreme Court had previously held that both adult defendants appearing in
juvenile court and juvenile offenders appearing before adult courts were entitled to the
constitutional safeguards applicable to an adult criminal trial. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370
U.S. 49 (1962) (juveniles in adult courts); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (juveniles in
adult courts); United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S 433 (1922) (adults appearing in juvenile
proceedings). See Antieau, supra note 34, at 391; Note, supra note 39, at 294 n.63.
65. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
66. The District of Columbia statute in question, D.C. CODE 11-914 (1961), provided
that a juvenile judge could waive jurisdiction after "full investigation." The petitioner
maintained that the summary hearing conducted by the juvenile court judge did not
constitute a "full investigation" or comport with fundamental standards of due process.
383 U.S. at 552. The Court held that "the admonition to function in a 'parental' relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness." Noting the impact that a waiver to

adult court has upon a minor, the Court stated, "There is no place in our system of law
for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony-without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons." Id. at 554-55.
See Note, supra note 39, at 293, 294.
67. 383 U.S at 554-55.
68. Kent purported to be solely a statutory interpretation of the waiver statute. Justice
Fortas, who later wrote the Gault opinion, however, stated that the decision in Kent was
warranted by the requirements of the statute as well as constitutional standards regarding due process and assistance of counsel. Id. at 557. See Rosenberg, The Constitutional
Rights of Children Charged With a Crime: A ProposalFor A Return to the Not So Distant Past,27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 656, 661 n.31 (1980).

69. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). For a thorough analysis of the Gault decision, see Dorsen &
Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1967). The authors
were counsel for the Gault family in the United States Supreme Court. See also Rosenberg, supra note 68, at 661-73.
70. 387 U.S at 13. A proceeding under the juvenile court's jurisdiction usually is
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ment that due process was inapplicable because juvenile proceedings were civil and did not result in criminal convictions.7 ' In so
doing, the Court noted that an adjudication of delinquency results
in the deprivation of a juvenile's liberty and carries an adverse
connotation similar to that of a criminal conviction. 7 2 These factors rendered the adjudicatory hearing quasi-criminal in nature,
thus implicating the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantees.7 3 The Court then outlined the minimum due process
standards for appropriate procedure in the juvenile courts.
In considering these constitutional standards, the Gault Court
indicated that it was unwilling to engraft all of the adult criminal procedures onto a juvenile delinquency adjudication, since

divided into three separate stages: intake, adjudication, and disposition. The intake stage
includes the initial decision to arrest or detain a juvenile. If the juvenile is detained, a
petition may be filed asserting facts sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court and proceed with an adjudication. The adjudicatory stage involves a fact-finding
hearing during which the court determines the validity of the allegations contained in
the petition and whether the minor should be adjudged a ward of the court. The disposition stage focuses on the proper treatment prescribed for the juvenile as a result of the
judge's findings at the close of the hearing. S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM, 3-2, 5-1, 6-1 (1983); George, supra note 41, at 315. See ILL REV. STAT. ch.
37, 701-18 (1983). The Gault Court's focus on the adjudicatory stage is characteristic of
its other decisions in the area of juvenile due process rights. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707 (1979); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The emphasis upon procedural safeguards at this stage derives from the fact that an adjudication of delinquency could result.
in the deprivation of a juvenile's liberty until he reaches the age of majority. Dorsen &
Rezneck, supra note 69, at 3-4; Popkin, Lippert & Keiter, Another Look at the Role of Due
Process in Juvenile Court, 6 A.B.A. FAm. L.Q. 233, 235 (1972). See generally Note, supra
note 39.
71. 387 U.S. at 13-14. Justice Fortas outlined the task of the Court: "As to the [delinquency] proceedings, there appears to be little current dissent that the Due Process
Clause has a role to play .... The problem is to ascertain the precise impact of the due
process requirement on such proceedings." Id. (footnote omitted). The Court emphasized
the substantive nature of the hearing and refused to succomb to the "feeble enticement of
the 'civil' label-of-convenience" customarily attached to juvenile adjudications. Id. at 50.
See Rosenberg, supra note 68, at 661-65.
72. 387 U.S. at 23-28. The Court refused to accept the state's arguments that an adjudication of delinquency and placement in a juvenile correctional institution do not
involve a deprivation of liberty similar to that resulting from a criminal conviction. For
this reason, the Court concluded that the juvenile's liberty interest is entitled to certain
due process protections recognized in adult trials. See Popkin, Lippert & Keiter, supra
note 71, at 237; Rosenberg, supra note 68, at 675.
73. 387 U.S. at 13. The Court began its discussion by stating: "Whatever may be their
precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill or Rights is for adults
alone ....
[Uinder our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a
kangaroo court." Id. at 13, 28. See Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 69, at 10-13. These
authors describe the Court's approach as one of selective incorporation similar to that
used to determine the applicability of certain provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states.
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some aspects of these proceedings benefitted the juvenile. 74 Thus,
instead of converting juvenile delinquency proceedings into full
criminal trials, 75 the Court imposed a constitutional framework
which would allow juvenile courts to retain their beneficent
characteristics and still provide juveniles with a fair adjudi76
cation.
The Gault court identified five specific safeguards applicable
to adult trials that the fourteenth amendment similarly mandated in juvenile proceedings: the right to notice, the right to
counsel, the rights to confrontation and cross-examination, and
the privilege against self-incrimination. 7 7 These due process
guarantees were viewed as crucial to accurate fact-finding and
the best insurance against an arbitrary deprivation of liberty.7
The Gault decision contained a clear expression of a juvenile's
constitutional right to timely and adequate notice of the specific
charges against him. 79 Notice serves the important function of
clarifying the issues and facts to be presented at the hearing,
thereby enabling the juvenile to prepare his defense and notifying the judge of the precise misconduct charged.8 0 The Court

74. 387 U.S. at 30. The Court reiterated its position stated earlier in Kent: "We do not
mean ... to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial ... but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment." Id. (citing Kent, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966)).
Further, the Court held that procedures relating to the intake and disposition stages of
the juvenile delinquency proceedings were left unaffected by the imposition of standards
at the adjudicatory stage. 387 U.S. at 22.
The Gault Court's decision to inject due process considerations into the juvenile court
proceedings was fortified by its conclusion that the protections adopted would not
hamper the special processes or purposes of the juvenile courts. The Court stated: "The
features of the Juvenile System which ... are of unique benefit will not be impaired by
constitutional domestication ....The observance of due process standards, intelligently
and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the State to abandon or displace any of
the substantive benefits of the juvenile process. Id. at 20-24. See Michael & Cunningham,
supra note 63, at 164; Note, supra note 39, at 295.
75. 387 U.S. at 22.
76. Id. See supra note 74.
77. 387 U.S at 31-59. The Court expressly declined to rule whether a juvenile has a
right to a transcript of the proceedings or to appellate review. Id. at 58. See generally
Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 69; Rosenberg, supra note 68; Note, supranote 39.
78. 387 U.S. at 33. The Court's emphasis on the relationship between a particular due
process consideration and the juvenile court's fact-finding duty is reiterated as a major
criterion in later cases addressing the applicability of adult procedures to juvenile proceedings. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
366 (1970). See infra text accompanying notes 84-93.
79. 387 U.S. at 31-34.
80. Id. at 34.
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noted that the informality of the proceedings often results in
inadequate notice to the juvenile and his parents, and for this
reason juvenile petitions must "set forth the alleged conduct with
particularity. 8 1 This requirement of specific notice would reduce
the possibility of arbitrary or capricious decisions.8 2 The Court
did not articulate the standard of specificity to be adopted, but
rather held that due process requires notice similar to that which
would be adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding.8 3
The Gault Court's recognition of a delinquency adjudication as
a quasi-criminal proceeding in which certain criminal procedures
were constitutionally required was reinforced three years later in
In re Winship.8 4 Winship held that a juvenile who is accused of a
crime and faces potential institutional confinement8 5 cannot be
adjudged delinquent on the basis of proof which would be insufficient to convict him if he were an adult. 86 Rather, the due process clause mandated that neither children nor adults may be
convicted of a crime unless every fact constituting the crime
87
charged is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The third major case addressing the due process rights of
8 8 The Court
juveniles was McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.
again

81.
82.

Id. at 33 n.52.
Id. at 18-21. The Court reasoned that:
Departures from established principles of due process have frequently resulted
not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness .... Due process is the primary and indispensable foundation of human freedom .... The procedural

rules which have been fashioned from due process are our best instruments for
the distillation and evaluation of essential facts .... It is these instruments of
due process that enhance the possibility that truth will emerge.
Id. See also Popkin, Lippert & Keiter, supra note 70, at 237. For a pre-Gault comment
regarding the importance of an accurate fact-finding body in the juvenile courts, see
Handler, supra note 41, at 26-31.
83. 387 U.S. at 33.
84. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
85. Id. at 365. Relying on sentiments previously enunciated in Gault,the Court stated:
"Civil labels and good intentions do not obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts, for [a] proceeding where the child [could] be subjected to the
loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution." Id. at
365-66 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36. (1967)). See Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 69, at
9; supranotes 73, 76.
86. 397 U.S. at 365.
87. Id. at 364, 368. The Court adopted the reasonable doubt standard because a criminal conviction potentially results in deprivation of liberty as well as a personal stigma.
Id. at 363. The Court further stated: "The same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child." Id. at
365. See Rosenberg, supranote 68, at 673-76; Note, supra note 39, at 299-300.
88. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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noted that the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings was that of fundamental fairness with emphasis on
fact-finding procedures.8 9 The McKeiver Court articulated a
balancing test to determine whether due process guaranteed
juveniles the right to jury trials 90 in delinquency hearings. The
Court weighed the assistance that a jury would provide in the
fact-finding hearing against the burden a jury would impose on
a juvenile court's operations. 91 As a result, the majority of the
Court concluded that jury trials were not constitutionally required
in juvenile delinquency proceedings because their adverse effect
outweighed the slight improvement in fact-finding that they
might provide. 92 Today, the prevailing constitutional analysis
with respect to the due process rights of juveniles in an adjudicatory hearing is this balancing test as enunciated by the Court in
93
McKeiver.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Gault, Winship, and

89. Id. at 543. The McKeiver Court appeared to resolve the ambivalence surrounding
the notice standards enunciated in Gault.The Court stated, "Some of the constitutional
requirements attendant upon the state criminal trial have equal application to that part
of the state juvenile proceedings .... [A]mong the[m] [is] the right to appropriate notice."
Id. at 533. The criminal standard of notice was subsequently adopted for the American
Bar Association's model rules for juvenile court proceedings. See JJS PRETRIAL, supra
note 54, at 29.
90. The sixth amendment provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be entitled to the right to trial by an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This right
was made applicable to the states throught the fourteenth amendment in Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
91. 403 U.S. 528,544-50 (1971).
92. Id. at 543-50. The Court reasoned that the implementation of a jury requirement
would render the juvenile system more adversarial and would rob the juvenile courts of
their existing "informality, flexibility and speed." Id. The potential impact of a due process right on the operations of the juvenile courts was also a factor discussed in the Gault
and Winship opinions. See supra notes 74, 76. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion,
maintained that when a state uses juvenile courts to prosecute a minor for a criminal act
and the juvenile faces potential confinement, he should be entitled to the same procedural
protections as adults. 403 U.S. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Several commentators regard McKeiver as a retrenchment from the broad application
of due process rights enuciated in Gault and Winship. See Rosenberg, supra note 68, at
676-684. But see Popkin, Lippert & Keiter, supranote 70.
93. The United States Supreme Court has decided two major juvenile cases subsequent to McKeiver. In Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), the Court held that the adult's
privilege against double jeopardy was equally applicable in juvenile court. Id. at 533-41.
The Court reached this conslusion by determining that neither "traditional principles
[n]or the 'juvenile court's assumed ability to function in a unique manner' supports an
exception to the 'constitutional policy of finality' to which the [minor] would otherwise be
entitled." Id. at 533. In. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), the Court considered
whether a juvenile's request to see his probation officer constituted an invocation of his
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McKeiver place constitutional restraints upon the juvenile justice
system, which had previously existed without any required standards of procedure. 9 4 These cases established that a delinquency
adjudication is a quasi-criminal proceeding in which certain
fundamental constitutional safeguards will be applied to assure
the accuracy and impartiality of the fact-finding process. Accordingly, the Court has recognized that the juvenile's right to timely
and adequate notice is critical to this fact-finding process because
it enables the juvenile to prepare his defense and informs the
95
court of the issues to be presented.
The Impact of Gault on the Illinois Juvenile Court System
The Illinois Legislative Response
The United States Supreme Court's recognition of due process
standards in juvenile proceedings resulted in widescale revisions
of juvenile codes across the country, including that of Illinois.96
The Illinois legislature responded in a manner consistent with
its long history of maintaining an attitude of concern and solici98
tude for juveniles 97 by amending the Juvenile Court Act
("the Act") to bring the procedures employed in juvenile delinquency proceedings into closer conformity with their adult criminal counterparts.
The Act was first amended in 1965, two years before Gault, to
guarantee juveniles the right to counsel, including court-appointed
counsel. 99 This provision also insured a juvenile the right to
examine court files and cross-examine witnesses. 0 0 In 1969, a
legislative amendment was passed which imposed both the criminal standard of proof and rules of evidence on juvenile delinquency hearings. 10
Miranda rights. The Court addressed this question assuming that Mirandaapplied to the
juvenile courts. As such, its discussion centered around the developing law surrounding
the Miranda decision, and not applicability of that right to the juvenile courts. See
Rosenberg, supra note 68, at 679-94; Note, supranote 39, at 303-04.
94. See supra notes 40-93.
95. See supra notes 79-83.
96. See generally, S. DAVIS, supra note 70; JJS PRETRIAL, supra note 54; Popkin, Lippert & Keiter, supra note 70. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act was in the process of

amendment when Kent was decided.
97. Michael & Cunningham, supra note 63, at 168; Recent Decision, supra note 63, at
332.
701-1 to 708-4 (1983).
98. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 37,
99. Id. 1 701-20.
100. Id.
101. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 37, % 704-6 (1983). These protections were first incorporated
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In addition to these three specific guarantees, the legislature
also amended the Juvenile Code in 1973 to include a general
provision addressing the procedural rights of juveniles. Paragraph 701-2(3)(a) provides that "the procedural rights of minors
shall be those of adults unless specifically precluded by laws
enhancing the protection of minors." 10 2 On its face, 10 3 this provision combines the constitutional concerns enunciated by the
uuSupreme Court with the sociological concerns which originally
prompted the creation of a separate juvenile court system. Enacted two years after McKeiver,0 4 paragraph 701-2(3)(a) reflects
that decision's balancing process by providing juveniles with the
due process rights of their adult counterparts unless otherwise
preempted by procedures more beneficial to the minor's best interests.10 5 By promulgating the statute in this fashion, the legislature avoided wholesale incorporation of the Illinois Code of
Criminal Procedure into the juvenile justice system, and yet provided the minor with an environment that was either procedurally equivalent or more solicitous to his interests than a com06
parable setting in adult court.
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act is not explicit with respect to
the specificity required in a juvenile petition. The petition, however, must allege facts sufficient to show that the minor committed an offense in violation of state or federal law, or a municipal

into the Juvenile Code in 1969.
102. Id. 701-2(3)(a). This act has been characterized as a codification of Gault.In re
Peevy, 43 Ill. App. 3d 579, 581, 357 N.E.2d 78, 80 (1976). See also People v. Woodruff, 90
Ill. App. 3d 236, 412 N.E.2d 1171 (1980), rev'd, 88 Ill.
2d 10, 430 N.E.2d 1120 (1981). The
appellate court in Woodruff characterized this act as "expressing an intention to grant
minors no fewer rights than they would enjoy if tried as adults, and in certain cases, to
afford them greater protections." Id. at 241, 430 N.E.2d at 1176. Other jurisdictions have
enacted similar provisions relating to procedural rights. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-6-7-1
(1983) (in delinquency cases, the procedures governing criminal trials apply in all matters
not covered by this article); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:4A-40 (1983) (all defenses available to an
adult charged with a crime shall be available to a juvenile charged with delinquency; all
constitutional rights guaranteed to adults except grand jury, bail, and trial by jury are
applicable to juveniles); N.Y. (DOM. REL) LAW § 303.1 (McKinney 1983) (criminal rules of
procedure are not specifically applicable, but interpretation of criminal procedure laws
may be used to assist the court in its determinations of juveniles); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.40.140 (1983) (in juvenile proceedings, all parties shall have the right to adequate
notice and discovery, as provided in criminal cases).
103. There is no legislative history of this statute.
104. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
105. See Rosenberg, supra note 68, at 671.
106. See supra note 102.
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ordinance. 0 7 In addition, the Act allows liberal amendments to
the original petition. The state may file one or more supplemental petitions "at any time before dismissal of the petition or
10 8
before a final closing and discharge.'
Further, the Act fails to set forth any provision enabling a
juvenile to contest the form of the charges against him. The legislation is silent with respect to the availability of standard
procedures in criminal courts which allow the defendant to challenge or request clarification of the charge. Unlike the Criminal
Code, there are no references to motions to dismiss, bills of particulars, pre-trial hearings, or modes of discovery. 10 9 Given the
absence of these express provisions, a juvenile contesting the
contents of a petition under the Juvenile Court Act can do so
only through the dictates of the general procedural rights provision, paragraph 701-2(3)(a)." °
The Illinois Courts' Response
The Illinois courts exhibited a complex and not entirely consistent reaction to these procedural changes in the juvenile courts.
They were confronted with a dramatic shift in juvenile court
theory, and were forced to address both the mandates of the
United States Supreme Court and the newly amended Juvenile
Court Act. Although the courts appeared to have adopted an
expansive reading of the Gault line of cases, they were reluctant
to grant the full procedural protection envisioned by the legislature in paragraph 701-2(3)(a).
The Illinois courts and commentators initially interpreted Gault
and its progeny as requiring substantial equivalence between the
juvenile delinquency adjudicatory hearing and the adult criminal trial." 1 In addition to the due process rights enumerated in

107. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 37, 1 A 704-1, 702-2 (1983). The Illinois Supreme Court has
stated: "Any responsible adult having knowledge of the circumstances may file a petition
under section 4-1." People ex rel. Davis v. Vazquez, 92 Ill. 2d 132, 150, 441 N.E.2d 54, 66
(1982).
108. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 37, 1h 704-1(6) (1983). See In re Cruz, 76 Ill.
App. 3d 565, 395
N.E.2d 388 (1979).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 13-28.
110. This avenue of attack is no longer available to a juvenile due to the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision in In re S.R.H., 96 Ill.
2d 138, 449 N.E.2d 129 (1983). See infra
text accompanying notes 161-63.
111. See, e.g., In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967); In re Carson, 10 Ill.
App. 3d 384, 294 N.E.2d 75 (1973); Dunne, Fourteenth Amendment, The Bill of Rights

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 15

Gault, Illinois courts have held that the Constitution requires
application of the exclusionary rule, 112 the privilege against
double jeopardy, 113 the right to a transcript of the proceedings, 1 14

the Miranda rule," 5 and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to delinquency hearings." 6 The Illinois Supreme Court

and the Juvenile Delinquent, 49 CHi. B. REC. 62, 69-72 (1967) (adjudication is conducted as
any other criminal trial with the exception of a jury); Michael & Cunningham, supra note
63, at 169 (Illinois courts will also apply equal protection standards to juvenile proceedings); Recent Decisions, supra note 63, at 329 (in the future all stages of juvenile procedure may be viewed as a criminal process). See generally Scott, Delinquency and Due
Process:A Review of Illinois Law, 59 CHI-KENT L. REv. 123 (1983).
112. See In re Marsh, 40 111. 2d 53, 237 N.E.2d 529 (1968) (test to determine the applicability of the exclusionary rule in adult trials applied to actions in juvenile court). See
Lipsett, supra note 44, at 73. Lipsett found the Marsh decision notable in its willingness
to extend this procedural safeguard to the pre-adjudication stage.
113. See In re Vitale, 71 Ill. 2d 229, 375 N.E.2d 87 (1978), cert. granted, vacated and
remanded mem., 439 U.S. 974 (1978), cert. granted, 444 U.S. 823 (1979), vacated and
remanded, 447 U.S. 410 (1980). In Vitale, the minor was tried in juvenile court for failure
to reduce speed to avoid an accident. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the privilege
against double jeopardy barred charging the youth with involuntary manslaughter arising out of the same accident. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1978

and then remanded to the Illinois Supreme Court to determine whether the state's decision was based on federal or state law. 439 U.S. at 974. The Illinois Supreme Court stated
that its decision was based on the federal Constitution, and the Supreme Court again
granted certiorari. 444 U.S. at 823. The Supreme Court again remanded to the Illinois
Supreme Court for a determination under Illinois law of the relationship between failure
to reduce speed to avoid an accident and involuntary manslaughter. 447 U.S. at 420. If,
under Illinois law, failure to reduce speed was in fact a lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, then the delinquency adjudication for the former offense would bar
his prosecution for involuntary manslaughter. Id. The Illinois Juvenile Code now provides that "taking of evidence in an adjudicatory hearing is a bar to criminal proceedings
based upon the conduct alleged in the petition." ILL REV. STAT. ch. 37, 702-7(3)(a)(6)(b)
(1983).
114. See In re Marsh, 40 Ill. 2d 53, 237 N.E.2d 529 (1968). The Marsh decision actually
accords juveniles more protection than their adult counterparts by providing that juveniles are entitled to a transcript of delinquency proceedings at all times, while adults are
only entitled to transcripts in felony proceedings. See ILL REV. STAT. ch. l10A, R. 661
(1983), for the codification of this holding.
115. See People v. Horton, 126 Ill. App. 2d 401, 261 N.E.2d 693 (1970) (procedural safeguards promulgated in Miranda are applicable to protect juveniles' fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination).
116. The Illinois Supreme Court's imposition of the reasonable doubt standard predated the United States Supreme Court's decision in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970),
by three years. See In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967). In Urbasek, the
court reversed an adjudication of delinquency for an eleven year old minor accused of
murdering his playmate because the allegations were not established beyond a reasonable doubt. Urbasek grounded the reasonable doubt standard not only on due process,
but also on equal protection. Id. at 541-42, 232 N.E. 2d at 719-20. See also Michael &
Cunningham, supra note 63, at 164-67. The United States Supreme Court has never
adopted an equal protection analysis when addressing the constitutional rights of juve-
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also enacted rule 660(a), which provides that appeals from judgments in juvenile delinquency proceedings are to be governed by
the rules applicable to criminal trials. 1 7
The Illinois courts also went further than Gault and its progeny by extending due process considerations beyond the adjudicatory stage to the disposition stage of juvenile proceedings. 118
For example, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a juvenile is
entitled to a hearing for probation revocation,11 9 and that a pro°
bation disposition must be for a set term or it is void.12
Although the courts were liberal in applying these procedural
protections of the criminal code to a juvenile proceeding, the process was not one of wholesale incorporation. The Illinois Supreme
Court expressly declined to apply criminal discovery rules,1 2' the
right to a jury trial,122 and the right to a speedy trial 2.3 to juvenile hearings.

niles. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 n.1 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967);
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
117. Rule 660(a) states: "Appeals from final judgments in delinquency minors proceedings, except as otherwise specifically provided, shall be governed by the rules applicable in criminal cases. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A,R. 660(a) (1983). In In re Pulido, 69 Ill.
2d
393, 372 N.E.2d 22 (1978) (per curium), the Illinois high court applied rule 660(a) to hold
that a juvenile committed to a correctional facility has a right to bond pending appeal.
The court reasoned that since there was nothing in the rule to preclude its application,

the juvenile was entitled to be released in the same fashion as an adult. Id. at 394, 372
N.E.2d at 822.
118. See supra note 74.
119. See In re Sneed, 72 Ill. 2d 326, 381 N.E.2d 272 (1978) (court cannot extend juvenile's probationary period for battery absent a violation of the conditions of probation).
120. See In re T.E., 85 Ill. 2d 326, 423 N.E.2d 910 (1981) (thirteen year old's probation
for theft must be for a set term).
121. See People ex rel Hanrahan v. Felt, 48 Ill. 2d 171, 269 N.E. 2d 1 (1971) (civil
discovery provisions do not routinely apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings; their
application is left to the discretion of the court). The Hanrahandecision left the issue of
civil versus criminal discovery rules unanswered. The Supreme Court, however, subsequently revised its criminal rules of discovery and declined to make the rules applicable
to juvenile delinquency proceedings. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110A,R. 411 committee comments

(Smith-Hurd 1976). See generally Geraghty, Juvenile Discovery:A Developing Trend and
a Word of Caution,7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 897 (1980).

122. See In re Fucini, 44 Ill. 2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380, appeal dismissed, 403 U.S. 925
(1971). The Fucini decision predicted the United States Supreme Court's analysis and
holding in McKeiver. See supra notes 88-92. The Illinois Court identified the standard as
"what elements of procedural protection are essential for achieving justice for the child
without unduly impairing the juvenile courts' distinctive values." 44 Ill. 2d at 310, 255
N.E.2d at 382. See Scott, supra note 111, at 131. There are some circumstances, however,
in which a juvenile does have a right to a jury trial. A juvenile has an absolute right to
have his case tried in adult court. In that case, the full panoply of rights guaranteed in
adult criminal trials would be applied. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 37, 702-7(3) (1983). In addition,
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In contrast to the Illinois courts' frequent willingness to extend
procedural protections on the basis of Supreme Court decisions
in juvenile law, responses to the legislative protections embodied
in paragraph 701-2(3)(a) have been surprisingly restrictive. The
Illinois Supreme Court has never granted a juvenile's request for
enhanced procedural rights on the basis of this statutory provision. For example, the court has held that paragraph 701-2(3)(a)
precludes a juvenile's right to a trial by jury during the delinquency hearing because the Juvenile Code requires all factual
determinations to be made by a judge and is, therefore, a "law
which enhances the protection of minors."'1 24 The right to a
speedy trial is also inapplicable to juvenile hearings 125 because
the Juvenile Code has its own provisions relating to the length
of time a juvenile may be held in custody. 126 Similarly, the court
has refused to apply the Supreme Court Rule relating to guilty

the state may elect to adjudicate the juvenile under the Habitual Juvenile Statute. This
statute is part of the Illinois Juvenile Code, and provides that a minor who has been
twice adjudicated a delinquent has a right to trial by jury in juvenile court for any subsequent commission of certain named offenses. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 37, 9 705-12 (1983).
123. See People v. Woodruff, 88 Ill. 2d 10, 430 N.E.2d 1120 (1981); In re Armour, 59 Il.
2d 102, 319 N.E.2d 496 (1974).
124. People ex rel Carey v. White, 62 Ill. 2d 193, 357 N.E.2d 512 (1976). In Carey, the
minors argued that the judge could empanel a jury in their cases of murder and armed
robbery. They contended that their rights to a jury trial derived not from the United
States Constitution, but from the general provisions of 701-2(3)(a). The court rejected the
minors' arguments, relying on the provisions of the Juvenile Code which state that all
factual determinations are to be made by the court. See ILL REV. STAT. ch. 37,
703-6(1),
704-8, 705-1 (1983). The court also reasoned that although the first Illinois Juvenile Code
permitted a six-man jury, the statute was subsequently amended to delete the provision,
thus evidencing a legislative intent to eliminate juries from juvenile proceedings. 62 Ill.
2d at 197, 357 N.E.2d at 514. See also Scott, supra note 111, at 131.
125. People v. Woodruff, 88 Ill. 2d 10, 430 N.E.2d 1120 (1981). The adult speedy trial
rules are contained in ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, 103-5 (1983), which provides: "Every person
in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody." The juvenile in Woodruff
had been transferred to adult court and he maintained that the 120 day period began to
run when he was taken into custody in juvenile court. The court rejected this argument.
126. Woodruff, 88 Ill. 2d at 14, 430 N.E.2d at 1123. See ILL REV. STAT. ch. 37, 9 703-1,
703-4, 703-5, 703-6 (1983). The court also refused to apply the criminal speedy trial rules
because juvenile proceedings are not supposed to be criminal in nature. But see Woodruff,
88 Ill.2d at 20, 430 N.E.2d at 1125 (Simon, J., specially concurring). Although Justice
Simon agreed with the court's decision, he disagreed with the court's assessment of 9
701-2(3)(a). He felt that the majority's refusal to recognize the criminal aspects of a juvenile proceeding created "a result that contravenes both the letter and the spirit of the
statute." 88 Ill.
2d at 21,430 N.E.2d at 1125 (Simon, J., specially concurring). Many of his
objections to the majority's interpretation of this statute were reiterated in In re S.R.H.
See infra text accompanying notes 172-74.
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pleas 127 to juvenile admissions. 128
Judicial Reaction to Notice
Prior to the decision in S.R.H., the Illinois courts wavered
between requiring a juvenile petition to conform to the standards
of an indictment 129 and holding the petition to a lesser standard
of scrutiny. 130 An early line of appellate cases adopted a parallel
,standard to evaluate the adequacy of juvenile petitions and criminal indictments.13l These courts reasoned that adjudications of
delinquency are based upon conduct that would be criminal if

127. Supreme Court Rule 402 dictates the procedures a criminal court judge must follow before accepting a guilty plea from the defendant. This procedure involves a detailed
inquiry into the factual basis for the plea, the defendant's awareness of the ramifications
of the plea, and a determination by the court that the plea is voluntary. ILL REV. STAT. ch.
110A, R. 402 (1981).
128. See In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d 385, 391, 362 N.E.2d 1024, 1027 cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1016 (1978). The Beasley court concluded that a juvenile's admission of guilt is valid if it
satisfies the constitutional requirement that it was knowingly and voluntarily made. See
In re Haggins, 67 Ill. 2d 102, 364 N.E.2d 54 (1977) (reaffirming the decision in Beasley).
Prior to the Beasley decision, the appellate court had imposed standards similar to rule
402 on juvenile admissions. See In re Peevy, 43 Ill. App. 3d 579, 357 N.E.2d 78 (1976). See
also Scott, supra note 111, at 141-43. Scott, a juvenile court judge from Lake County, Ill.,
proposes that juvenile court judges should attempt to comply substantially with rule 402,
even though they are not required to do so, in order to insure maximum protection for the
juvenile.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 131, 132. See also Antieau, supra note 34, at
410; Popkin, Lippert & Keiter, supra note 70, at 257-59. Both of these articles advocate the
adoption of stricter standards for juvenile petitions in order to achieve maximum protection for the child.
130. The courts which have held a petition to a lesser level of scrutiny reason that the
rehabilitative purpose of the delinquency proceedings and its informal nature militate
against treating the two charging instruments equivalently. See In re Interest of Whittenburg, 16 111. App. 3d 224, 305 N.E.2d 363 (1973). Cf. People ex rel Davis v. Vazquez, 92
Ill. 2d 132, 441 N.E.2d 54 (1982).
131. People v. Horton, 126 Ill. 2d 401, 261 N.E.2d 693 (1970) (conviction reversed
because petition alleged receipt of stolen goods, evidence proved theft itself); In re
McGovern, 62 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 379 N.E.2d 937 (1978) (petition alleging sale of narcotics
must contain same elements as a criminal indictment charging the same offense); People
v. Longley, 16 Ill. App. 3d 405, 306 N.E.2d 527 (1973) (both parties agree that allegations
in a petition for wardship must meet the requirements of an indictment); In re Carson, 10
Ill. App. 3d 387, 294 N.E.2d 75 (1973) (specificity required because public policy of the
state is that the courts carefully guard the rights of minors). See S. DAVIS, supra note 70,
at 5-2 to 5-5; Scott, supra note 111, at 132-33; JJS PRETRIAL, supra note 54, at 29-32. See
also In re Wylie, 231 A.2d 81 (D.C. 1967) (petition insufficient to allege an offense); Davies
v. State, 171 Ind. App. 487, 357 N.E.2d 914 (1976) (petition alleging first degree burglary
must charge the offense with the particularity of an indictment); In re Hitzman, 281 Minn.
275, 161 N.W.2d 542 (1968) (petition alleging theft of auto tires must conform to requirements of criminal complaint); In re Dennis, 291 So. 2d 731 (Miss. 1974) (petition alleging
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committed by an adult, and thus a juvenile is entitled to the
same detailed and timely notice as his adult counterpart.' 32 This
approach was not unanimous among the appellate districts,
however. A few decisions maintained that the nature and purpose of the juvenile court engendered its own standards of sufficiency. Accordingly, allegations that a juvenile committed a3
3
named offense were sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement.
Regardless of the standard of sufficiency applied at the trial
level, the courts agreed that a less stringent test would be applied
when the sufficiency of the petition was challenged for the first
time on appeal. 134 This procedure of relaxing the specificity
requirements when a petition is initially challenged on appeal is
35
consistent with the practice in criminal courts.
The juvenile's right to notice and ability to challenge the petition derived from the courts' expansive interpretation of United
States Supreme Court pronouncements, and not from independent protections in the Illinois Juvenile Code. In re S.R.H. placed
the issue of the specificity required in a juvenile petition squarely
before the Illinois Supreme Court.

grand larceny and burglary must charge the offense with the particularity of an indictment); In re Walsh, 59 Misc. 2d 917, 300 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1969) (due process requires the
petition alleging juvenile set fire to a church to be as specific as a criminal indictment); In
re D.S.H., 549 P.2d 826 (Okla. 1976) (petition alleging juveniles "sniffed glue" must meet
requirements of a criminal accusation).
132. See In re Interest of Bryant, 18 Ill. App. 3d 887, 310 N.E.2d 713 (1974); In re
Carson, 10 Ill. App. 3d 384, 294 N.E.2d 75 (1973). In a different context, the Illinois
Supreme Court recently acknowleged that "due process of law requires that notice in
juvenile proceedings be equivalent to that constitutionally required in criminal or civil
cases." People v. R.D.S., 94 Ill. 2d 77, 79, 445 N.E.2d 293, 296 (1983). The issue in R.D.S.,
however, was whether the proper parties had been served notice of the proceedings; the
court did not discuss the contents of the notice required.
133. See People v. Casper, 22 Ill. App. 3d 188, 317 N.E.2d 352 (1974); In re Interest of
Whittenburg, 16 Ill. App. 3d 224, 305 N.E.2d 363 (1973). Both of these cases indicate a
lesser test of sufficiency should be applied to a petition challenged at trial. Whittenburg,
however, clearly involved a petition that was not challenged until appeal. Casper seems
to be of the same posture, although it is not clear from the opinion.
134. See In re D.L.B., 102 Ill. App. 3d 75, 439 N.E.2d 615 (1982) (petition alleging
"curfew violations, theft and burglary" was "woefully deficient," but minor waived the
right to challenge it because he did not object until appeal); In re Greene, 76 Ill. 2d 204,
390 N.E.2d 884 (1979) (failure to challenge age at trial results in waiver on appeal); People
v. Casper, 22 II. App. 3d 188, 317 N.E.2d 352 (1974) (petition alleging minor violated
curfew laws and obstructed officers upheld); In re Interestof Whittenburg, 16 Ill. App. 3d
224, 305 N.E.2d 363 (1973) (considered test of sufficiency of indictment to a challenge to a
petition which was raised for the first time on appeal).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
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FactualContext
In re S.R.H.1 36 involved the delinquency adjudication of a
teenager accused of burglarizing a garage owned by the minister
of his church youth group.1 37 The minor contended that he was
authorized to be on the property, and hence could not be guilty of
burglary, since unauthorized entry is an essential element of a
burglary charge. 138 The petition filed against the minor traced
the language of the Illinois burglary statute, but failed to include
1
the words "without authority."

39

At the close of the hearing, the minor's counsel argued that the
petition was fatally defective for failure to charge the "without
authority" element, and moved to dismiss the case. 140 The state
asserted two theories in support of its argument that the petition
was sufficient despite this omission. First, because lack of authority is not a separate element of a burglary charge, the state's
omission could not invalidate the charging document.141 Alternatively, even if authority were an element of a criminal charge

136. 96 Ill. 2d 138, 449 N.E.2d 129(1983).
137. Id. at 141,449 N.E.2d at 130.
138. Brief of Appellant-Minor at 15-19, In re S.R.H., 106 Ill.
App. 3d 276, 435 N.E.2d
883 (1982). The Illinois Criminal Code defines burglary as follows: "A person commits
burglary when without authority he knowingly enters or without authority remains
within a building... or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
19-1(a)(1983) (emphasis added). The evidence regarding whether
the juvenile had permission to enter the building was conflicting. Although the owner
testified that the minor had no authority to enter the garage alone, there was contrary
testimony from a neighborhood priest that the minor had permission to be alone on the
premises on at least one previous occasion. 96 Ill. 2d at 141, 449 N.E.2d at 130.
139. The petition filed against the minor in In re S.R.H. alleged, inter alia, that the
minor "committed the offense of Burglary in violation of Section 19-1 of ch. 38 of the Ill.
Rev. Stat.... in that he knowlingly entered the building.., with the intent to commit
therein a theft." 96 111. 2d at 141, 449 N.E.2d at 130.
140. Id. at 142, 449 N.E.2d at 130.
141. Both sides argued vigorously over the necessity of alleging "without authority"
in any burglary charge. The state relied on a series of cases which held that lack of
authority was no longer an element of the offense and that the fact of non-authority
could be established by mere proof of felonious intent See, e.g., People ex relMcLain v. Housewright, 9 Ill. App. 3d 803, 293 N.E.2d 911 (1973); People v. Alequin, 12 Ill.
App. 3d 837, 298
.N.E.2d 723 (1973). The minor distinguished these cases as the "public buildings doctrine,"
which allows the inference of non-authority in public buildings because failure to do so
would render burglary of a public building logically impossible. In support of his position,
the minor relied upon People v. Peace, 88 Ill. App. 1090, 411 N.E.2d 334 (1980); People v.
Baker, 59 111. 3d 100, 375 N.E.2d 176 (1978); People v. Weaver, 41 Ill.
2d 434, 243 N.E.2d
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for burglary, the state maintained that juvenile petitions are not
required to conform to the standards of a criminal indictment. 142
The trial court denied the minor's motion to dismiss and adjudged
him a delinquent, apparently relying upon the state's argument
that "without authority" was not a critical element of a burglary
charge.14 3 The issue of whether a juvenile petition must satisfy
the same standards of specificity required in an indictment was
not addressed by the trial court.
The Appellate Court
The Illinois Appellate Court rejected the state's contention
that lack of authority was not an element in the charge of burglarizing a private residence. 144 It considered the state's alternative argument that juvenile petitions need not be held to the
14 5
same standards of specificity as adult charging instruments.
The court held that in order to comply with the requirements of
the Juvenile Court Act, 146 a petition must set forth facts sufficient to show that a minor has committed a crime under state
law. 147 The S.R.H. petition's failure to allege the element of
unauthorized entry rendered it fatally defective, since its allega-

245 (1969). For an overview of the arguments of both sides of the authority issue, see
Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 531 (1964). But see ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 19-1 committee comments
(Smith-Hurd 1981) (paragraph 19-1 codifies the existing Illinois law by combining unlawful entry with various elements of the common law definition of burglary).
142. 106 111 App. 3d at 278, 435 N.E.2d at 884. An indictment must state the nature
and the elements of the offense. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, 111-3(a) (1983). See supra notes
16, 24.
143. The basis for the judge's decision is unclear. He did not address the issue of
whether the requirements of a petition were identical to those of an indictment. In his
adjudication of delinquency, he stated:
I think we are being overly concerned about whether or not he had authority.
Let's grant the fact that he had authority to enter the house.... As soon as he
entered the outbuilding with intent to commit a theft or a felony, he commits
the offense of burglary whether or not he was authorized to enter in the first
place.
Brief of Minor-Respondent at 16-17, In re S.R.H., 96 111. 2d 138, 449 N.E.2d 129 (1983).
144. 106I1. App. 3d at 278-80, 435 N.E.2d at 885.
145. In support of this proposition, the state cited In re Interestof Whittenburg, 16 Il.
App. 3d 224, 305 N.E.2d 363 (1973). This case was distinguished because, although the
petition at issue failed to state the elements of aggravated battery, it did adequately state
the nature and elements of simple battery, which was a lesser included offense. 106 Ill.
App. 3d at 278, 435 N.E.2d at 884.
146. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 37,
701-1 to 708-4 (1983).
147. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 279, 435 N.E.2d at 885. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37,
702-2, 704-1
(1983). See also Scott, supra note 111, at 132. Scott cited the appellate decision as an
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tions were insufficient to comprise an offense proscribed by state
law.148
Because the minor's counsel had first raised the issue at the
trial level, the court applied the standards of competency as set
forth in the Code of Criminal Procedure to the petition. 149 Since
a criminal indictment is required to state the nature and the
elements of the offense, the petition's failure to comply with
those requirements warranted its dismissal. 150 Thus, the appellate court appeared to follow the predominant, although not
unanimous, view of the Illinois courts that a juvenile's right to
challenge the sufficiency of a petition closely paralleled that of
an adult. 151
The Supreme Court
The Majority Opinion
On appeal,1 5 2 the Illinois Supreme Court analyzed the appellate court's holding that a petition challenged by a juvenile at
the trial level must be reviewed under the same standards used

indication of the degree of specificity Illinois Juvenile Courts will require in a juvenile
petition.
148. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 280, 435 N.E.2d at 886. For the statutory definition of burglary,
see supra note 138.
149. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 280, 435 N.E.2d at 886. The court did not discuss why the
criminal rules would apply. It assumed that because the petition was challenged at trial,
the same standards of competency would be used to evaluate it. Id. The Code of Criminal
Procedure provides that "[a] charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an
offense by [s]etting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged ....
ILL REV.
STAT. ch. 38, $ 111-3(a) (1983).

150. The Criminal Code further provides that the court may dismiss the charge if it
fails to state an offense, and that the court shall grant the defendant's motion in arrest of

judgment when the indictment, information, or complaint does not charge an offense.
ILL REv. STAT. ch. 38,
114-1 (8), 116-2(b)(1) (1983).
151. This case, however, was argued much differently than the previous cases addressing a juvenile's right to notice. The line of appellate cases which applied similar standards relied upon their interpretations of the Gault opinion. These cases were not referred
to in either the court's opinion or the minor's briefs. The minor's argument for equivalent
standards was premised on its reading of 701-2(3)(a). Brief for Appellant-Minor at 12, In
re S.R.H., 106 11. App. 3d 276, 435 N.E.2d 883 (1982). There is no indication in the appellate court opinion, however, that it accepted this argument as a basis for its decision. But
see In re S.R.H., 106 Ill. App. 3d at 280, 435 N.E.2d at 886 (Reinhard, J., dissenting). The
dissent argued that the petition should be upheld because the minor was sufficiently
apprised of the crime with which he was charged. In addition, the dissent maintained
that the issue of authority as a requirement in a burglary charge should be definitively
resolved. Id.
152. In re S.R.H., 96 1. 2d 138, 449 N.E.2d 129 (1983). The S.R.H. decision was virtually unanimous. Of the seven-man panel, only one justice dissented.
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to assess the sufficiency of a criminal indictment. 153 The juvenile's argument before the supreme court was founded solely on
the statutory provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, and did not
54
address the constitutional dimension of the notice requirement.'
The minor contended that petitions must allege facts establishing a violation of state law as mandated by the Juvenile Court
Act. 155 This provision, coupled with the procedural protections
set forth in paragraph 701-2(3)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, required petitions to be judged under the same standards
1 56
as adult criminal indictments.
The issue thus framed before the court was whether these two
paragraphs of the Juvenile Code required a delinquency petition
to conform to the requirements of a criminal indictment. 157 In a
1 59
brief opinion, 158 the majority acknowledged the "surface logic"'
of the minor's argument. The court held, however, that the two
provisions do not render a juvenile petition the equivalent of a
criminal indictment for the purpose of a challenge to the suffi60
ciency of a charging instrument.
The majority reasoned that paragraph 701-2(3)(a) does not
create parity between juvenile and criminal proceedings because
juvenile hearings do not result in a criminal conviction and are
61 It
not intended to be adversarial like those in criminal court.
stressed the importance of retaining a distinction between juvenile and criminal courts. 62 The right to notice of all the ele153. Id. at 142, 449 N.E.2d at 131. On appeal, the supreme court did not discuss
whether authority was a necessary element of a burglary charge.
154. The minor's brief reiterated its arguments at the appellate level. Brief of MinorRespondent at 7, In re S.R.H., 96 M. 2d 138,449 N.E.2d 129 (1983). The minor reasoned:
The allegations in the petition at bar do not describe any offense. Specifically,
while the petition alleges that the minor entered a garage with the intent to

commit a theft therein, it does not allege that a theft was committed in fact.
Authorized entry of a building with such intent is not recognized as an offense
under our Criminal Code.
Id. at 9. Actually, the thrust of the arguments in the briefs at both the appellate court and
the supreme court centered around whether authority was an element of a charge of
burglary.
155. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 37,
701-2(3)(a), 702-2, 704-1 (1983).
156. 96 Ill.
2d at 143, 449 N.E. 2d at 131. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
701-2(3)(a), 702-2,
704-1 (1983).

157.
158.
devoted
159.
160.

96111. 2d at 143,449 N.E.2d at 131.
The majority's opinion is six and one half pages long. Three of these pages are
to an explanation of the facts of the case.
96111. 2d at 143, 449 N.E.2d at 131.
Id.

161.

Id.

162.

Id. at 144, 449 N.E.2d at 131.
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ments of the offense charged was outside the scope of paragraph
701-2(3)(a) because this guarantee is set forth only in the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the delinquency petition was not
to be judged by the same standards of specificity as a criminal
16 3
indictment.
The court then considered whether the United States Constitution requires a juvenile petition to meet criminal standards of
specificity. It disposed of any due process argument in two paragraphs. Acknowledging that due process safeguards have been
extended to juvenile proceedings in the past, the court cited
Gault, McKeiver, and Winship, 64 stating that those cases im65
posed a test of "fundamental fairness" on juvenile proceedings.
As applied to a delinquency petition, this test requires only a
statement of facts that leaves "no real doubt" regarding the acts
166
charged.
Eschewing the standards of the Criminal Code, the majority
devised a less stringent test to determine the validity of a petition challenged at the trial level. 16 7 The Court held that a petition should be dismissed only if the juvenile could show actual
prejudice caused by the omission. This is the same criterion used
to judge the sufficiency of an indictment initially challenged on
appeal. 68 The petition will be upheld if it alleges facts sufficient
to allow the accused to prepare his defense and plead a resulting
conviction as a bar to future prosecution.1 69 The burden of establishing prejudice is on the juvenile challenging the petition.
Applying this standard to the S.R.H. petition, the majority
held that the minor was not prejudiced by the petition's failure to
plead lack of authority. 170 In addition, the majority upheld the
trial court's adjudication of delinquency because the evidence at
trial was not sufficiently improbable to raise a reasonable doubt
7
concerning that finding.' '

163. Id.
164. Id., 449 N.E.2d at 131-32. The majority cited Gault as the source of this standard,
but its analysis of the requirements of fundamental fairness differs significantly from
that employed in Gault. See infra text accompanying notes 175-79.
165. 96 Ill. 2d at 145, 449 N.E.2d at 132.

166. Id.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
See supratext accompanying notes 29-31.
Id.
96 Ill. 2d at 146, 449 N.E.2d at 132.
Id.
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The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent argued that the civil label of juvenile proceedings
does not diminish the rights of minors who are in a position to
lose their liberty as a result of an adverse adjudication. 172 Further,
it accepted the minor's interpretation of paragraph 701-2(3)(a),
and accused the majority of failing to honor the legislative intent
to give juveniles certain procedural rights unless specifically precluded by laws more favorable to children. 173 The dissent disagreed with the majority's differentiation of the juvenile and
adult charging instruments, especially when the imposition of
similar standards of sufficiency would not create an intolerable
174
burden on the state.
ANALYSIS
The S.R.H. opinion addresses both statutory and constitutional requirements of notice in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The narrow holding under the former, combined with the
summary disposition of the latter, results in a decision with significant ramifications for future practices adopted by the Illinois
juvenile courts. The opinion poses problems regarding constitutional and statutory interpretation as well as practical difficulties with respect to implementing the "actual prejudice" standard at the adjudicatory level of a juvenile proceeding.
ConstitutionalInterpretation:A Retreat From Gault?
In S.R.H. the Illinois Supreme Court confronted the issue of
the degree of specificity required in a petition in order to satisfy a
juvenile's right to notice, as recognized by the United States
Supreme Court over fifteen years ago.1 7 5 In addressing that
question, the S.R.H majority distorted the spirit and the standards enunciated in Gault and its progeny. In fact, the court's
method of determining the permissible content of a juvenile petition is reminiscent of the standards employed prior to the Gault
decision. 176 Although it cited Gault as authority, the S.R.H. inter-

172.

Id. at 146-47, 449 N.E.2d at 132-33 (Simon, J., dissenting).

173.

Id.

174.
175.
176.

Id. at 147, 449 N.E.2d at 133-34 (Simon, J., dissenting).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34 n.54 (1967). See supra text accompanying notes 69-83.
See supra text accompanying notes 50-58.
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pretation of a minor's due process right to notice detracts signifi177
cantly from the strictures in that case.
Gault emphasized the critical role that proper notice plays in a
fact-finding hearing as a safeguard of individual liberty. 178 In
contrast, the majority's interpretation of fundamental fairness
downplays the need for specificity in juvenile petitions. According to the Illinois Supreme Court, "fundamental fairness" demands no more than a recitation of facts leaving "no real doubt"
179
as to the acts charged.
The S.R.H. decision also fails to acknowledge or comply with
the balancing test enunciated by the Supreme Court in McKeiver
8 0 McKeiver instructed courts to weigh the benev. Pennsylvania.1
fits of applying a procedure to juvenile proceedings against the
detriment that the practice would have upon the unique operations of the juvenile court.'"' The S.R.H. opinion did not discuss
either the potential benefits of according juveniles the adult
standard of notice or the countervailing hardships of imposing
similar requirements. 8 2 Instead, it merely stated in a conclusory
fashion that juvenile petitions are subject to less stringent standards of specificity than adult charging instruments.
Consideration of the McKeiver test, however, would have led
the Illinois Supreme Court to a different result. This test emphasizes the relationship between accurate fact-finding and fundamental fairness. 183 Against these concerns, which would be
served by requiring petitions to conform to criminal standards,
the court would have weighed any resulting burdens, either on
the state or on the juvenile.
Given these factors to balance, the court would have recognized that inclusion of these safeguards poses no significant

177.

See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See supra text accompanying notes

60-83.
178. See supra notes 79-83. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 33. There, the Court noted that
"no purpose" is served by allowing the courts to conduct hearings based on inadequate
notice. Justice Fortas concluded: "[Due process] does not allow a hearing to be held in
which a youth's freedom and his parent's custody are at stake without giving them
timely notice of the specific issues they must meet." Id. at 34.
179. 9611. 2d at 145, 449 N.E.2d at 132.
180. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). See supratext accompanying notes 88-93.
181. 403 U.S. at 545-50.
182. The majority'.s failure to address this issue was also criticized by the dissent. 96
Ill. 2d at 147, 449 N.E.2d at 133-34 (Simon, J., dissenting).
183. 403 U.S. at 543.
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burdens on the state, nor would it have any detrimental effect on
the procedures currently employed in juvenile court. Thus, adoption of parallel standards would have provided the juvenile
increased protection against a deficient petition without disrupting the state's efforts to control juvenile delinquency. The actual
prejudice standard selected by the majority in S.R.H. could not
have withstood McKeiver's balancing test. This standard accords
no additional benefits to the minor, and exists as a potential
source of prejudice to the juvenile's constitutionally guaranteed
184
right to notice.
The S.R.H. court based its decision on outdated distinctions
between the delinquency adjudication of a juvenile and the criminal trial of an adult. 185 This premise belies the national recognition of a delinquency hearing as a quasi-criminal proceeding in
which specific procedural safeguards must be applied. 86 Judicial reliance upon the civil label once attached to the system has
been uniformly rejected as a basis for differential treatment of
juveniles, especially when constitutional rights are involved. 187
Similarly, the court's reliance on the non-adversarial and nonstigmatizing nature of the adjudicatory hearing indicates its
unwillingness to recognize the development of the Illinois juvenile courts over the last twenty years. 88 A finding of delinquency results in a stigma as potentially damaging as a criminal conviction. 89 Both result in a deprivation of the offender's
liberty. Moreover, while juvenile proceedings are intended to be
non-adversarial, the courts and the legislature have recognized
that certain safeguards of the adversary system are essential to

184. See infra text accompanying notes 200-04.
185. See supratext accompanying notes 161-63.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 69-93. See generally Rosenberg, supra note
68; Note, supranote 39.
187. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the "civil label of convenience" as an excuse to deny due process rights to juveniles. See In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1967); Kent v. United States, 353
U.S. 541, 555 (1966); Antieau, supra note 34, at 387-92; Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 69,
at 9.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 98-123.
189. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 23-24. See supra text accompanying note 72. See also
Handler, supra note 41, at 13-14. In addition, an adjudication is no longer strictly guarded
from public knowledge. Recent amendments in Illinois' Juvenile Code have expanded
access to the juvenile's court records to "any law enforcement or social service personnel,

military personnel, authorized researchers, authorized member of the general public, certain high school officials, and victims of juvenile crime." Pub. Act 82-973 (1982).
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insure accurate fact-finding in the hearing and to protect the
individual's liberty. 190
Absent any justification outside of the traditional, 191 largely
outdated arguments regarding the philosophy of the juvenile
courts, the decision in S.R.H. also represents a significant retrenchment from precedents specifically involving notice and from the
Illinois Supreme Court's previous liberal interpretations of
Gault.192 In fact, the strong line of Illinois cases which required
the same standards for juvenile and adult charging instruments
was not addressed in the majority's opinion. The Illinois Supreme
Court's own liberal readings of Gault evidenced in earlier cases
were likewise notably absent from the S.R.H. decision.
Paragraph701-2(3)(a): An Ignored Source of ProceduralRights
The S.R.H. opinion also established that paragraph 701-2(3)(a)
of the Juvenile Court Act does not provide juveniles with a statutory right to the same standards of notice as an adult criminal
defendant. Despite the grant of procedural rights to minors in
this provision and the similar purpose of the juvenile and adult
charging instruments, 193 the majority held that a delinquency
petition does not have to conform to the statutory standards of
specificity required in a criminal indictment.
In support of its decision, the majority relied on previous cases
that refused to interpret paragraph 701-2(3)(a) to require parallel

190. See, e.g., ILL REv. STAT. ch. 38, 701-20 (1983):
The minor who is the subject of the proceeding ... has the right to be present, to
be heard, to present evidence material to the proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, to examine pertinent court files and records and also, although proceedings under this Act are not intended to be adversary in character,the right to
be represented by counsel.

Id. (emphasis added).
The dissent strongly criticized this rationale, citing several instances in the past when
the court had accorded rights to juveniles, despite the fact that the proceedings were
intended to be non-adversary. 96111. 2d at 146-47,449 N.E.2d at 133-34 (Simon, J., dissenting).
191. These arguments have been characterized as traditional because they emanate
from the theoretical underpinnings of the juvenile courts. They are also traditional arguments in the sense that the state has attempted to use them to justify its differential
treatment of juveniles in almost every juvenile case that has come before the Supreme
Court Note, supranote, at 259 n.4.
192. See supra notes 131-32. It is the articulated public policy of the state to carefully
guard the interests of minors. See People ex rel. Davis v. Vazquez, 92 IM. 2d 132, 441
N.E.2d 54 (1982); In re Carson, 10 Ill. App. 3d 384,294 N.E.2d 75 (1973).
193. See supranotes 19-23.
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standards for juvenile and adult proceedings. 194 Granted, the
Illinois Supreme Court has adopted a narrow interpretation of
this statutory provision in the past. 195 The procedural rights at
issue, however, were never among those which the United States
Supreme Court had already extended to juvenile proceedings. 96
The S.R.H. court never addressed the statutory command that
juveniles are entitled to the procedural rights of their adult counterparts "unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance
the protection of minors.' 197 The majority's failure to discuss the
implications of the statute's exclusion clause is noteworthy in
light of the clear constitutional mandate regarding notice and
Illinois precedent entitling juveniles to similar standards of
198
specificity.
The majority's refusal to interpret paragraph 701-2(3)(a) broadly
has troubling implications which go beyond the juvenile's right
to notice. Paragraph 701-2(3)(a) was promulgated as a general
grant of procedural rights to juveniles. By declining to apply
adult procedural safeguards to juvenile proceedings, in apparent
contradiction of the statutory exclusion, the majority effectively
emasculates this legislative guarantee of due process rights. The
conclusion in S.R.H., combined with the court's previous refusals
to recognize rights under paragraph 701-2(3)(a), creates a dubious
194. 96 Ill. 2d at 142, 449 N.E.2d at 131.
195. See supranotes 124-28.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 124-28. See also People v. Woodruff, 88111. 2d
10, 430 N.E.2d 1120 (1981) (speedy trial); In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d 385, 362 N.E.2d 1024
(1977) (Supreme Court Rule 402); People ex rel Carey v. White, 62 Ill. 2d 193, 357 N.E.2d
512 (1976) (jury trials). The United States Supreme court has held that jury trials are not
constitutionally required in the juvenile court setting. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971). See also supra text accompanying notes 88-93. It has not addressed the
applicability of speedy trial rules. The Illinois Juvenile Code actually has stricter rules
regarding the custody of minors than those contained in the criminal code. See ILL REV.
STAT. ch. 37, 703-5 (1983). Additionally, the standards of rule 402, which were at issue in
In re Beasley, were more stringent that those required by the United States Supreme
Court. The Beasley court held that a minor's admission would be held to the test previously dictated by the Supreme Court for adults. 66 Ill.
2d 385, 391, 362 N.E.2d 1024, 1028
(1977).
197. The dissent also criticized the majority for avoiding the words of the statute:
Just as -we do not allow adults to be deprived of their liberty without a full
recitation in the charging instrument of the elements of the crime alleged,

neither should we allow juveniles to face detention in a State facility and a
record of delinquency based on a burglary offense without a similar recitation
when they are charged with serious antisocial conduct. The Juvenile Court Act
says nothing to the contrary, and in fact appears to require this.
96 Ill.
2d at 449, 134 N.E.2d at 134 (Simon, J., dissenting).
198. See supranotes 129-35.
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future for reliance on this paragraph as a source of any increase
in procedural rights for juveniles.
Implementation of the S.R.H. Standard
The court in S.R.H. adopted a standard of actual prejudice for
judging the adequacy of juvenile petitions. The majority's adoption of this test for petitions challenged at the adjudication stage
fails to provide consistent or uniform guidelines for juvenile
court judges. 9 9 The utilization of this test usually involves a
hindsight determination by an appellate court with the benefit of
a trial transcript. 20 0 By contrast, when a challenge to the sufficiency of a petition is made at the adjudication stage, the juvenile court judge is in a comparatively poor position to assess
whether the juvenile will actually be prejudiced in the preparation of his defense. The difficulty in interpreting this vague
standard may engender the use of inconsistent and arbitrary
criteria to assess the sufficiency of juvenile petitions. 20 1 Furthermore, adoption of the actual prejudice test for petitions challenged at trial poses the question of what standard will be applied to petitions challenged for the first time on appeal. If the
courts adhere to the practice of applying a lesser standard on
appeal, 20 2 the juvenile's practical inability to challenge an allegedly deficient petition may become even more pronounced.
The actual prejudice test, as applied at the trial level, not only
places a burden on juvenile court judges, but also unduly burdens
the juvenile challenging the petition. The juvenile must be able
to demonstrate at the outset that he is or will be prejudiced by
the deficiencies in the petition. The facts of S.R.H. illustrate the
20 3
difficulty of this task.

199. See In re D.L.B, 102 Ill. App. 3d 75, 429 N.E.2d 615(1982). In D.L.B., the appellate
court was critical of the lack of adequate standards in juvenile proceedings:
[W]e view with dismay the steadily increasing informality with which juvenile
matters are being handled. Undoubtedly the Juvenile Court Act was intended
to disentangle minors from much of the legalism attendant upon adult criminal
prosecutions, but we find nothing in this humanitarian approach which should
strip a minor of the most elementary right of any offender, that of knowing
precisely what he is charged with.
Id. at 76, 429 N.E.2d at 616.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
201. See supranotes 29-31, 199.
202. See supranotes 29-31.
203. The premise of the juvenile's argument was that authority is an essential ele-
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The Role of a Juvenile Petition
The decision in S.R.H. has placed the juvenile in a paradoxical
position. He faces many of the same penalties as an adult, yet is
not accorded the same protections. Because the charging instrument is the initial framework of a judicial proceeding, the quality
of notice in the instrument is essential to any accused individual,
minor or adult.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the petition provides the
juvenile, his parents, and counsel with notice of the charges
pending against him. A juvenile charged by way of an inadequate petition is in a more precarious position than an adult
under similar circumstances. Developments in criminal law have
counteracted the need for detailed notice in the criminal charging instrument. 2 4 The criminal defendant no longer prepares
his case solely on the basis of the indictment or information.
Unlike the criminal defendant, however, a juvenile is not auto20 5
matically entitled to request discovery or a bill of particulars.
The need for enhanced specificity in the delinquency petition is
apparent because this instrument is frequently the juvenile's
only source of information upon which he may prepare his
defense. In addition, liberal policies for amendment of the petition 20 6 indicate that the juvenile relies upon the diligence of the

state not only to provide a petition sufficiently detailed to prepare a defense, but also to counter any additional allegations
that the state may raise. Given the critical function of a juvenile
petition, the impact of S.R.H. is far from academic.
CONCLUSION
Illinois has always been at the forefront in developments in
the field of juvenile law. This state originally established the
ment in a burglary charge. The trial court concluded that authority was immaterial to a
charge of burglary. See supra note 143. In contrast, the appellate court recognized authority as an essential element of the offense. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 280, 435 N.E.2d at 886.

Without resolving the authority issue, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the minor was
not prejudiced by the failure to allege without authority. The majority also concluded that
the element of authority was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 96 Ill. 2d at 146, 449
N.E.2d at 132.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
205. An adult is entitled to request both under the Code of Criminal Procedure. ILL
REV. STAT. ch. 38,
113-1, 114-2 (1983), and the Illinois Supreme Court Rules, ILL REV.
STAT. ch. ll0A, R. 411-15 (1983).
206. See supra note 108. See also ILL REV. STAT. ch. 37,

704-6 (1983).
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juvenile courts in an attempt to protect juveniles accused of misconduct from the harsh treatment of the adult criminal system.
Juvenile courts were designed to promote the minor's best interests, and to create an informal setting wherein a juvenile could
be rehabilitated instead of punished.
These informal procedures often led to arbitrary adjudications
and dispositions. During the 1960's, several due process guarantees were engrafted onto the juvenile proceedings by the United
States Supreme Court. The right to adequate and timely notice of
the specific charges was one of the critical rights afforded to
minors.
In In re S.R.H., the Illinois Supreme Court held that a juvenile
petition in delinquency was not subject to the same standards
used to judge the sufficiency of a criminal indictment. The
court's refusal to apply equivalent standards represents a retreat
from Illinois' historically progressive position in the area of
juvenile law. In addition, it places the juvenile's right to notice in
a precarious position because the court selected a standard of
appraisal which does not lend itself to uniform application.
Finally, the majority's refusal to recognize parallel standard
standards under the Juvenile Code's grant of procedural rights
results in a dilution of the procedural protection that the legislature specifically incorporated in the Illinois Juvenile Court Act.
KATHERINE M. BIGANE

